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I.

INTRODUCTION

Consider the following scenario: The State of Texas charges a
young man named Jonathan with aggravated robbery. Because he is
an indigent, the State provides a court-appointed attorney to represent him. However, Jonathan is dissatisfied with his attorney because he will not return his phone calls, he will not investigate
Jonathan's case, and he has refused to contact him. After speaking to
the appointed attorney, Jonathan's family believes the attorney will be
unable to handle the case properly. Consequently, Jonathan wants a
change in his appointed counsel. Before the trial begins and without
legal assistance, Jonathan files two motions expressing to the court his
dissatisfaction and requesting a change in his appointed counsel.
However, the judge does not rule on the motions. At the conclusion
of the State's case, Jonathan asks the judge if the court had denied the
motions and if so, whether that decision was entered into the records.
The judge tells Jonathan that not only were his motions not going to
be included in the record, but that he would not even consider them
because the Texas law did not require him to do so.
However, the law in Texas does require the judge to consider
Jonathan's motions. There are certain circumstances in which a defendant, upon a proper sltowing, is entitled to a change in appointed
counsel.1 "If a defendant is displeased with his appointed counsel, he
must bring the matter to the court's attention. Thereupon, the defendant carries the burden of proving that he is entitled to a change of
counsel."2
The hypothetical situation above is based on a real case in which an
indigent defendant brought his dissatisfaction with his appointed
1. See Malcom v. State, 628 S.W.2d 790, 791 (Tex. Crim. App. [Panel Op.] 1982).
2. Id.
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counsel to the judge's attention.3 On appeal, the young man argued
that the trial court should have granted him a hearing to explain the
reasons for his dissatisfaction with his appointed attorney. 4 The appellate court stated that he was not entitled to a hearing because he
did not request one.5 Essentially, the appellate court held that the
right to a hearing was conditioned on the utterance of the proper procedural "magic words." 6 If the young man had been assisted by legal
counsel when making his motion and request, the attorney probably
would have asked for a hearing on the matter, and the young man's
request would have been considered by the court. In this case, the
court did not hear the defendant's request to obtain a substitute counsel because he failed to follow a procedural rule.7
Indigent defendants in Texas must be provided interim counsel for
the limited purpose of assisting them in satisfying the procedural burdens imposed on them when they are requesting a change in appointed counsel because both the Sixth and the Fourteenth
Amendments require this. Without the assistance of an interim counsel, the right to request a change in appointed counsel is essentially
meaningless. This violates the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments. In
order to remedy this constitutional problem, the State of Texas must
provide interim counsel for indigent defendants in this proceeding.
This Comment will address indigent defendants' need for interim
counsel when requesting a change in appointed counsel. Part I will
discuss the historical development of indigent defendants' right to appointed counsel. Part II will examine the current state of indigent defendants' right to counsel as required by the Sixth and Fourteenth
Amendments. Part III will examine how Texas courts currently treat
indigent defendants who attempt to obtain a change in appointed
counsel. Texas cases will be discussed in order to illustrate the problem. Part IV will discuss how this proceeding merits the protections
provided by the Sixth and the Fourteenth Amendments. Part V will
discuss the cost considerations involved in providing interim counsel
in this proceeding. Finally, Part VI will consider other alternatives to
providing interim counsel, such as lowering the procedural burden or
providing standby counsel.

3.
4.
5.
6.
7.

Hill v. State, 686 S.W.2d 184, 185-86 (Tex. Crim. App. 1985) (en banc).
Id. at 186.
Id. at 187.
See id.
Id.
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BACKGROUND

The HistoricalDevelopment of Indigent Defendants'
ConstitutionalRight to Counsel

Our country's adversarial system is one that contemplates a contest
between two opposing parties.' In order to have a "fair fight," the
Sixth Amendment provides that "[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right ... to have the Assistance of Counsel for
his defence." 9 Providing the assistance of counsel will promote bal-

anced contests by equalizing the adversarial system. "Counsel brings
legal expertise, knowledge of the system, tactical and strategic savvy,

and a commitment to the defense of the accused against state efforts
to impose a criminal penalty." 10 Over the years, the United States

Supreme Court has continued to define the requirement of fairness as
it relates to appointed counsel."
1. Powell v. Alabama

In 1932, the United States Supreme Court first addressed the constitutional requirement of the right to counsel in the case of Powell v.
Alabama.1 2 In this case, the Court held that indigent defendants
should receive appointed counsel to assist them in preparing a mean8. James J. Tomkovicz, The Massiah Right to Exclusion: ConstitutionalPremises
and DoctrinalImplications, 67 N.C. L. REV. 751, 753 (1989).
9. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
10. Martin R. Gardner, The Sixth Amendment Right to Counseland Its Underlying
Values: Defining the Scope of Privacy Protection, 90 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 397,
465 n.16 (1999-2000) (quoting Tomkovicz, supra note 8, at 753).
11. See, e.g., Evitts v. Lucey, 469 U.S. 387, 396 (1985) (holding that due process
entitles a convicted indigent defendant to appointed counsel on her first appeal of
right); Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 367, 373-74 (1979) (reaffirming the holding in
Argersinger);Ross v. Moffitt, 417 U.S. 600, 610, 616-17 (1974) (stating that the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause does not require the appointment of counsel
to assist indigent appellants in discretionary state appeals and for application for review in the United States Supreme Court); Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 37
(1972) (holding that an indigent defendant is entitled to the appointment of counsel if
he actually, not merely potentially, will be jailed if he is convicted); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 343 (1963) (reiterating the proposition that indigent defendants
have a fundamental right to appointed counsel in criminal trials); Betts v. Brady, 316
U.S. 455, 471-73 (1942) (holding that due process of law does not demand that in
every criminal case, a state must furnish counsel to an indigent defendant), overruled
by Gideon, 372 U.S. at 345; Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 463 (1938) (stating that
the Sixth Amendment requires federal courts in all criminal proceedings to provide
accused indigents with appointed counsel); Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 71 (1932)
("[I]n a capital case, where the defendant is unable to employ counsel, and is incapable adequately of making his own defense because of ignorance, feeble mindedness,
illiteracy, or the like, it is the duty of the court, whether requested or not, to assign
counsel for him as a necessary requisite of due process of law; and that duty is not
discharged by an assignment at such a time or under such circumstances as to preclude the giving of effective aid in the preparation and trial of the case.").
12. See 287 U.S. at 52.
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ingful defense.' 3 The Court believed that the indigent defendants
needed the assistance of counsel due to their unique circumstances,
such as their youth, their illiteracy, the force of public hostility against
them, and their isolation from family and friends. 1 4 The Court implied that these factors may have contributed to an unfair trial, and
15
the assistance of counsel would have helped to avoid that possibility.
According to the Court, "[T]he right to be heard would be, in many
cases, of little avail if it did not comprehend the right to be heard by
counsel."' 6 The Court stated that even intelligent men need assistance in understanding the law and applying it to themselves.' 7 Assistance of counsel guards against this danger, and a defendant "requires
the guiding hand of counsel at every step in the proceedings against
him."1 8 However, in Powell, despite the broad language of the Court,
the right to appointed counsel was restricted to those capital cases in
which not only was the defendant unable to hire an attorney, but he
was also "incapable adequately of making his own defense because of
ignorance, feeble mindedness, illiteracy, or the like."19
2.

Johnson v. Zerbst

Six years later in Johnson v. Zerbst,2° the United States Supreme
Court held that an indigent defendant has a Sixth Amendment right to
appointed counsel in federal felony prosecutions. 2 ' The Court's reasoning for extending the right to counsel to indigent defendants in
federal cases was very similar to the reasoning in Powell.22 The Court
focused on the indigent defendant's general lack of knowledge regarding the legal system and his inability to protect his life or liberty
interest.23
3.

Betts v. Brady

Although the Court appeared to be moving in a direction of broadening the constitutional right to counsel for indigent defendants, it rejected an invitation to extend the Sixth Amendment right to counsel
13. See id. at 71.
14. See id. at 50-52, 71 (explaining that the defendants were met at the Scottsboro,
Alabama train station by a large mob, and although it did not appear defendants were
ever at serious risk of physical harm, the sheriff thought that it was necessary to call
for the militia to assist in safeguarding the prisoners).
15. Id. at 71-73.
16. Id. at 68-69.
17. Id. at 69.
18. Id.
19. Id. at 71.
20. 304 U.S. 458 (1938).
21. See id. at 467.
22. Id. at 463.
23. Id.
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to the states in Betts v. Brady.24 The Court held that due process did
not require automatic appointment of counsel in all criminal trials because in some circumstances, it was possible to have a fair trial without assistance of counsel." The Court's holding led to a case-by-case
determination of whether appointed counsel was necessary in order to
conduct a fair and reliable trial.
4.

Gideon v. Wainwright

Twenty-one years later, the United States Supreme Court overruled
Betts in the landmark case of Gideon v. Wainwright.26 In this case, the
Court rejected the Sixth Amendment case-by-case approach. Instead,
it chose to apply the Sixth Amendment right to counsel to states via
the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause. 7 The Court reasoned that if states find it important enough to hire prosecutors to
represent their interests, then they must believe that attorneys are
necessary to conduct an effective trial.2 8 In addition, the Court noted
that almost every defendant who was able to hire an attorney did so.2 9
These facts emphasized to the Court the importance of representation
by counsel.3 0 Attorneys in criminal cases were considered necessities,
not luxuries.3 1 The Court also stressed that every defendant is entitled
to procedural safeguards, which assure him a fair trial.32 As a result of
Gideon, states were required to appoint counsel to represent indigent
defendants in felony cases.3 3
5.

Argersinger v. Hamlin

The United States Supreme Court further expanded Sixth Amendment protections in the case of Argersinger v. Hamlin.3 4 In this case,
the Court held that the right to counsel extends beyond felonies to
24. See 316 U.S. 455, 471-73 (1942), overruled by Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S.
335, 345 (1963). When this case was decided, eighteen states already had statutes that
required court-appointed counsel in all cases where defendants were unable to procure counsel. Betts, 316 U.S. at 470. These states were California, Idaho, Illinois,
Iowa, Kansas, Michigan, Montana, Nevada, New Jersey, New York, North Dakota,
Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, South Dakota, Tennessee, Utah, and Wyoming. Id. at 470
n.28. In addition, Connecticut provided "official public defenders" to all those unable
to retain counsel. Id.
25. Id. at 471-73.
26. 372 U.S. 335, 345 (1963). Florida and two other states asked the Court to
uphold Betts; twenty-two states "argue[d] that Betts was an 'anachronism when
handed down.'" Id.
27. Id. at 342-45.
28. Id. at 344.
29. Id.
30. See id.
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. Id. at 342-45.
34. See 407 U.S. 25, 30 (1972).
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misdemeanors that result in actual incarceration of any duration.
The Court was not impressed with the argument that legal and constitutional issues are less complex in misdemeanor cases than in felony
cases. 36 The Court also expressed concern that the great volume of
misdemeanor cases may lead to "cookie cutter" type dispositions,
which would be more vulnerable to unfair procedures than in felony
trials. 37 The Argersinger Court explicitly declared that no term of incarceration can be imposed on an individual unless counsel represent
him.38
III.

THE PRESENT STATUS OF INDIGENT DEFENDANTS'
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO COUNSEL

A.

The Sixth Amendment Right to Appointed Counsel at All
Critical Stages

As demonstrated by the cases above, the United States Supreme
Court has continued to focus on the issue of fairness and to insist that
indigent defendants be provided the assistance of counsel when it is
necessary to ensure that a procedure itself is fair.39 Today, the Sixth
Amendment entitles indigent defendants to the appointment of counsel in all cases, state and federal, resulting in actual imprisonment.4 °
The language of the Sixth Amendment suggests that it only applies to
the criminal trial41 and not to proceedings peripheral to the actual trial
itself. But the United States Supreme Court has expanded the scope
of a critical stage and has recognized that the assistance of counsel
"would be less than meaningful if it were limited to the formal trial
itself."' 42 The Court has determined that certain events surrounding a
trial have a critical impact on the fairness of the trial, and in these
"critical stages," it is necessary for defendants to have the assistance
of counsel.4 3

The determination of a critical stage in a criminal proceeding is not
based on when the event in question occurred, but rather, if the proceeding might prejudice a defendant's rights and if counsel could help
avoid the prejudice.44 The Court has held that a defendant must be
provided assistance of counsel in these situations, whether the stage of
the proceeding is formal or informal, in the court or out of the court. 5
35. Id. at 37.
36. Id. at 33.
37. Id. at 34-36.
38. Id. at 37.
39. See supra Part I.A.
40. Id.
41. U.S. CONST. amend. VI (stating "for his defence" and "[i]n all criminal
prosecutions").
42. United States v. Ash, 413 U.S. 300, 309-10 (1973).
43. See id. at 309-11.
44. United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 226 (1967).
45. Id.
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Defining Critical Stage

Critical stages are those in which the Court has deemed that the
46
assistance of counsel is necessary to protect the defendant's rights.
A defendant will have numerous interactions with individuals involved in the criminal justice system that will not be deemed critical
stages of the criminal proceeding.4 7 For instance, a defendant in jail
will be subjected to daily contact with the police, yet most of these
interactions do not warrant the assistance of counsel to protect his
rights. Critical stage determination focuses on whether the assistance
of counsel is necessary to protect the defendant's rights in a particular
situation.4 8
In order to qualify as a critical stage, the United States Supreme
Court has determined that a proceeding must satisfy three criteria: the
proceeding in question must occur after the initiation of adversarial
proceedings; 49 the defendant must be forced to confront either the
prosecution or the procedural system;50 and the presence of counsel
must be necessary to guard against the potential prejudice at the
proceeding.5 '
a.

The Proceeding Must Occur After Adversarial Proceedings
Have Begun

Defendants in criminal proceedings are provided protection by
counsel once adversarial proceedings have begun because "[tihe initiation of judicial criminal proceedings is far from a mere formalism."5 2
It is at this point that the full force of the State and the prosecution is
brought to bear in order to convict a criminal defendant.5 3
The United States Supreme Court has declined to establish a brightline definition of when adversarial judicial proceedings begin and has
instead left this decision to state courts.54 The initiation point has
been defined as the time of arraignment, preliminary hearings, formal
charges, or indictment.5 5
46.
47.
48.
49.

Id. at 226-27.
See Green v. State, 872 S.W.2d 717, 720 (Tex. Crim. App. 1994) (en banc).
Wade, 388 U.S. at 226-27.
See Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682, 689-90 (1972).

50. United States v. Gouviea, 467 U.S. 180, 188-89 (1984) (quoting United States
v. Ash, 413 U.S. 300, 310 (1973)).
51. Wade, 388 U.S. at 226-27.
52. Kirby, 406 U.S. at 689.
53. See id.
54. Id. at 689. In Gouveia, the Court held that prisoners suspected of committing
murder in prison were not entitled to appointment of counsel when placed in adminis-

trative segregation for over ninety days because this action did not qualify as the

initiation of adversarial proceedings. Gouveia, 467 U.S. at 192.
55. Kirby, 406 U.S. at 688-89. The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals has not definitively addressed the question of when the adversarial process begins. See, e.g.,
DeBlanc v. State, 799 S.W.2d 701, 706 (Tex. Crim. App. 1990) (stating that the Sixth
Amendment right to an attorney does not arise until defendant is indicted); Spence v.
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b.

The Proceeding Must Force the Defendant to Confront Either the
Prosecution or the ProceduralSystem

Second, to qualify as a critical stage, the proceeding must force the
defendant either to confront the prosecution or the procedural sys-

tem. 56 "[T]he core purpose of the [Sixth Amendment] counsel guar-

antee was to assure 'Assistance' at trial, when the accused was
confronted with both the intricacies of the law and the advocacy of the
public prosecutor." 5 7 The United States Supreme Court recognized
that the layperson is often unable to participate in a legal proceeding
on equal grounds with professionals in the legal system such as judges,
police officers, and prosecutors. 58 In Johnson v. Zerbst the Court observed, "That which is simple, orderly and necessary to the lawyer, to
the untrained
layman may appear intricate, complex and
59
mysterious.

2.

Counsel Could Assist Defendants in Protecting Their Rights

Finally, to qualify as a critical stage meriting the assistance of counsel, the confrontation must involve the possibility of harm to the accused's right to a fair trial, or other proceeding, if forced to proceed
without counsel and the assistance of counsel would reduce the
harm.6 0 For instance, if certain rights could be lost if an indigent defendant did not raise them at a particular time, and the assistance of
counsel could help protect these rights, the court will deem that stage
of the procedure a critical stage.61
That was the case in Mempa v. Rhay. 62 The United States Supreme
Court held that deferred sentencing was a critical stage during which
counsel should be appointed because the right would be lost if the
defendant did not assert the right to deferred sentencing at that particular time, and an "uncounseled defendant might very likely be unaware of this opportunity. ' 63 The Court further recognized that an
unaided layperson would not be able to successfully argue the law or
cope with the procedural system.64
State, 795 S.W.2d 743, 752-53 (Tex. Crim. App. 1990) (en bane) (holding that defendant did not have Sixth Amendment right to counsel at the taking of dental impressions because defendant had not been formally charged or indicted); Garcia v. State,
626 S.W.2d 46, 53 (Tex. Crim. App. 1981) (en banc) (indicating that "the filing of
formal charges" is when the Sixth Amendment right to counsel attaches).
56. See Kirby, 406 U.S. at 689-90.
57. United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 649, 654 (1984) (quoting United States v.
Ash, 413 U.S. 300, 309 (1973)).
58. Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 69 (1932).
59. Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 463 (1938) (quoting Patton v. United States,
281 U.S. 276, 308 (1935)).
60. United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 226 (1967).
61. See Mempa v. Rhay, 389 U.S. 128, 134-37 (1967).
62. 389 U.S. 128 (1967).
63. Id. at 135-37.
64. United States v. Ash, 413 U.S. 300, 307 (1973).
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Pretrial and Posttrial Proceedings May Qualify as Critical Stages
of a Criminal Proceeding

Because the United States Supreme Court has granted indigent defendants representation of counsel in pretrial and posttrial proceedings, one might infer that the Court deems these events "critical
stages" of the judicial proceeding.6 5 In United States v. Ash,66 the
Court noted that, just as during the trial itself, there are many pretrial
events in which the defendant is confronted with the complexities of
the procedural system.6 7 These pretrial proceedings are "critical" if
the presence of counsel is essential to protect the fairness of the trial
itself. 68 Additionally, in Maine v. Moulton,6 9 the Court explained that
fairness interests required that counsel be present for certain pretrial
events or the "results might well settle the accused's fate and reduce
the trial itself to a mere formality. ' 7° Whether a pretrial proceeding
constitutes an adversary judicial proceeding essentially depends upon
whether "the accused [is] confronted with both71 the intricacies of the
law or the advocacy of the public prosecutor."
The Supreme Court has expanded the definition of a critical stage
even further and held that the right to counsel may be effective in
circumstances that are neither judicial nor formally adversarial, such
as line-ups, police interrogations, and psychiatric examinations. 72 This
interpretation of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel is not only
65. See, e.g., Coleman v. Alabama, 399 U.S. 1, 9-10 (1970) (concluding that defendant is entitled to counsel at preliminary hearings); Mempa, 389 U.S. at 135 (holding
that the revocation of defendant's probation and the imposition of sentencing was
invalid because the defendant was not represented by counsel); Wade, 388 U.S. at
236-37 (stating that defendant is entitled to counsel at post-indictment lineups);
Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353, 355-58 (1963) (holding that accused is entitled to
the assistance of counsel for a first appeal as of right); White v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 59,
59-60 (1963) (per curiam) (holding that the Sixth Amendment right to counsel applied at a preliminary hearing because at this hearing the defendant was asked to
plead, and his guilty plea was able to be used against him at trial even thought the
plea was later withdrawn); Hamilton v. Alabama, 368 U.S. 52, 54 (1961) (holding
defendant was entitled to counsel at arraignment because of risk that defendant
would lose a defense if it was not raised at that point).
66. 413 U.S. 300 (1973).
67. Id. at 310.
68. See Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 238-39 (1973).
69. 474 U.S. 159 (1985).
70. Id. at 170 (quoting Wade, 388 U.S. at 224).
71. United States v. Gouveia, 467 U.S. 180, 188-89 (1984) (alteration in original)
(quoting Ash, 413 U.S. at 309).
72. See Powell v. Texas, 492 U.S. 680, 681 (1989) (holding that "once a defendant
is formally charged, the Sixth Amendment right to counsel precludes such an examination without first notifying counsel that 'the psychiatric examination [will] encompass the issue of their client's future dangerousness.'" (quoting Estelle v. Smith, 451
U.S. 454, 471 (1981))); Maine, 474 U.S. at 187 (holding that "the State violated
Moulton's Sixth Amendment right [to counsel] when it arranged to record conversations between Moulton and its undercover informant"); Wade, 388 U.S. at 236-37
(holding that the Sixth Amendment requires the presence of appointed counsel at a
post-indictment lineup because it is a critical stage).
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consistent with the literal language of the Sixth Amendment, which
requires the existence of counsel at both a criminal prosecution and at
the time of accused, but also with the purposes that the right to counsel serves, including assuring aid at trial and critical pretrial proceedings when the accused is confronted with the intricacies of criminal
law.73
B.

The Fourteenth Amendment Right to Appointed Counsel

Not only does the Sixth Amendment provide indigent defendants
the assistance of counsel under certain conditions, 4 the Fourteenth
Amendment's Due Process Clause also entitles indigents to the assistance of counsel in many cases. The Fourteenth Amendment of the
Constitution provides that "[n]o state shall ... deprive any person of
life, liberty, or property without due process of law."'76 The United
States Supreme Court has held that due process of law guarantees
"fairness between the State and the individual dealing with the
state." 77 The constitutional guarantee to a fair procedure assures the
individual that he will have the opportunity to present his case before
that state deprives him of a right.7 8 This is especially important in
criminal trials where the defendant risks losing a liberty interest. In
fact, the Supreme Court has held that a criminal trial does not comport with due process standards unless a defendant has counsel to represent him.7 9
This guarantee of a fair procedure is often referred to as "procedural due process."8 In a procedural due process claim, "[T]he deprivation may be entirely legitimate-a State may have every right to
discharge a teacher or punish a [citizen]-but the State may nevertheless violate the Constitution by failing to provide appropriate proce' 81
dural safeguards.
1.

Proceedings that Are Subject to the Fourteenth Amendment's
Due Process Clause

Like the Sixth Amendment's limitation of the right to counsel to
only those stages of a criminal proceeding that are deemed critical, the
Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause does not apply in every
stage of a criminal proceeding. The Supreme Court has held that only
those proceedings that have a significant impact on the trial are sub73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.

Gouveia, 467 U.S. at 188-89.
Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 467-68 (1938).
Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 342-43 (1963).
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
Evitts v. Lucey, 469 U.S. 387, 405 (1985).
See Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 337 (1986) (Stevens, J., concurring).
Evitts, 469 U.S. at 394 (quoting Gideon, 372 U.S. at 340).
Daniels, 474 U.S. at 337 (Stevens, J. concurring).
Id. at 338.
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ject to the requirements of the Due Process Clause because of the
possibility that a state will deprive an indigent of a liberty interest.82
For example, in Ake v. Oklahoma,83 a murder trial, the Court held
that because the indigent defendant planned to use his mental state as
a defense the due process requirements compelled the state to provide

access to a psychiatrist's assistance for a pretrial examination if the

indigent defendant could not afford one. n The Court noted that the
examination result could have a significant impact on the outcome of
the trial.8 " By providing the defendant with the assistance of a psychi-

atrist, the defendant would be able to present enough meaningful information to the jury in order to allow them to make a sensible
determination.8 6

2.

Analysis of a Due Process Claim

Once it has been determined that a proceeding will have a significant impact on the outcome of a trial, it must be determined if the
proceeding complies with the requirements of due process.8 7 A court

must answer two questions when analyzing a due process claim.88 The
first question determines the nature of the interest at stake: Is the government depriving the individual of a life, liberty, 89 or property inter-

82. See Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68, 74-84 (1985).
83. 470 U.S. 68 (1985).
84. Id. at 83. The United States Supreme Court determined that three factors
were relevant in deciding if the participation of a psychiatrist was important enough
to the preparation of the defense to require the state to provide indigents with the
assistance of a psychiatrist. Id. at 77. The first factor that they examined was the
private interest that the state's action would affect. Id. The Court determined that
the private interest of a defendant in a criminal proceeding in which he might be
deprived of a liberty interest weighed heavily in favor of providing psychiatric assistance. See id. at 78. The second factor examined the interest of the state. Id. at 77.
The Court noted that the state's interest in prevailing at trial is "tempered by its interest in the fair and accurate adjudication of criminal cases." Id. at 79. The Court
stated that the state does not have a substantial interest in preventing psychiatrists
from assisting defendants. See id. The third factor inquired into the probable value of
providing the assistance of a psychiatrist. Id. at 77. The Court found that psychiatric
expertise was necessary to present an effective defense. Id. at 82. After balancing the
interest of the individual, the state, and the probable value of providing the assistance,
the Court determined that due process required the state to provide an indigent defendant with the assistance of a psychiatrist. Id. at 77-83.
85. Id. at 82-83.
86. Id. at 82.
87. See id. at 76-83.
88. See Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481 (1972) ("Once it is determined that
due process applies, the question remains what process is due."); Bd. of Regents of
State Colls. v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 570-71 (1972); Ex Parte Robinson, 116 S.W.3d 794,
796 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003).
89. A liberty interest is defined as "[f]reedom from arbitrary or undue external

restraint, esp. by a government."

BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY

937 (8th ed. 2004). The

United States Supreme Court has stated that liberty "is not confined to mere freedom
from bodily restraint. Liberty under law extends to the full range of conduct which
the individual is free to pursue, and it cannot be restricted except for a proper governmental objective." Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 499-500 (1954).
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est? 90 The interest at stake must be one that falls within the
protections afforded by the Fourteenth Amendment.9 1 If none of
these interests is implicated by a particular government act the government may act as arbitrarily or unfairly as it wishes.
The second question inquires into the fairness of the proceeding: In
depriving the individual of life, liberty or property interest, was the
proceeding fair to the defendant?9 2 And if the proceeding was unfair,
what procedure is needed to remedy the problem?93 The procedure
must provide the defendant a fair opportunity to present his case in a
meaningful way.94

In order to prevail on a due process violation claim, an individual
must show that the state procedure has a basic defect that is so serious
it renders the proceeding fundamentally unfair.9" The United States
Supreme Court has recognized that "when a State brings its judicial
power to bear on an indigent defendant in a criminal proceeding, it
must take steps to assure that the defendant has a fair opportunity to
present his defense."9 6 The right to present a defense must amount to
more than a "meaningless ritual," 97 and it must not impede the defendant from participating in an "adequate and effective" procedure.98
The Court "recognized long ago that mere access to the courthouse
doors does not by itself assure a proper functioning of the adversary
process, and that a criminal trial is fundamentally unfair if the State
proceeds against an indigent defendant without making certain that he
has access to the raw materials integral to the building of an effective

defense." 99 Essentially, to satisfy the fairness requirement of the

Fourteenth Amendment, the procedure should not prevent the defendant from presenting his case for adjudication on the merits."°
3. State Granted Discretionary Rights are Subject to the
Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause
The United States Supreme Court has held that when a state provides a discretionary right it must also comport with the dictates of the
Due Process Clause.10 1 For example, the Court has held that states
90. Ex Parte Robinson, 116 S.W.3d at 796.
91. Roth, 408 U.S. at 570-71.
92. See id. at 589.
93. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 324 (1976).
94. Id. at 333 (citing Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545, 552 (1965)).
95. Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 341 (1986) (Stevens, J., concurring).
96. Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68, 76 (1985).
97. Ross v. Moffitt, 417 U.S. 600, 612 (1974) (quoting Douglas v. California, 372
U.S. 353, 358 (1963)); cf.Evitts v. Lucey, 469 U.S. 387, 393 (1985) (citing Douglas,372
U.S. at 358).
98. Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 17, 20 (1956).
99. Ake, 470 U.S. at 77.
100. Evitts, 469 U.S. at 405.
101. Id. at 401.
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are not required to grant appeals as of right to criminal defendants.' 0 2
However, if a state has created appellate courts as "an integral part of
the ... system for finally adjudicating the guilt or innocence of a defendant," and gives criminal defendants an appeal as of right, then the
procedures used in granting this
discretionary right must comport with
10 3
the demands of due process.
The States of Illinois and California created statutory rights of appeal."° Yet, both states imposed burdens on some defendants attempting to exercise this right, and the United States Supreme Court
held that those burdens violated the requirements of the Fourteenth
Amendment's Due Process Clause. 0 5 For example, in Griffin v. Illinois, °6 the Court held that an Illinois law requiring an appellant to
provide a trial transcript as a condition of filing an appeal was unconstitutional.' 017 The Court further held that in order to satisfy the fairness requirement of the Due Process Clause the trial court must
provide a transcript to an indigent defendant in order to assure an
"adequate and effective appeal" for the defendant. °
Similarly, a California law was held unconstitutional in Douglas v.
California"°9 because it required the appellate court to review the trial
record to determine if indigents would benefit from the assistance of
counsel before providing appointed counsel." 0 The Supreme Court
stated that "Uj]ust as a transcript may by rule or custom be a prerequisite to appellate review, the services of a lawyer will for virtually every
layman be necessary to present an appeal in a form suitable for appellate consideration on the merits.""' The Court recognized that "in a
legal system governed by complex rules and procedures" the assistance of counsel is necessary for defendants to obtain decisions at
112
all-much less favorable decisions on the merits.
In Griffin and Douglas, the defendants raised due process concerns
because the right to appeal did not afford procedures that gave them a
fair opportunity to present their cases for the court's consideration."'
Rather, the results of the states' laws were to deny indigent defendants access to the proceedings because they were unable to present
102. See McKane v. Durston, 153 U.S. 684, 687-88 (1894) (holding that whether,
and under what circumstances, an appeal should be allowed is for each state to determine for itself).
103. Griffin, 351 U.S. at 18.
104. Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353, 356 (1963); see Griffin, 351 U.S. at 18.
105. See Douglas, 372 U.S. at 355-57; Griffin, 351 U.S. at 19.
106. 351 U.S. 12 (1956).
107. See id. at 19.
108. See id. at 19-20.
109. 372 U.S. 353 (1963).
110. See id. at 357.
111. Evitts v. Lucey, 469 U.S. 387, 393 (1985).
112. Id. at 394 n.6.
113. See Douglas, 372 U.S. at 354-55; Griffin, 351 U.S. at 12.
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their cases in a form capable of adjudication. 114 In both cases, the
Supreme Court provided tools to indigent defendants, which allowed
them an opportunity to participate in the proceedings.
In Ross v. Moffitt," 5 the Supreme Court limited Griffin and Douglas by distinguishing the right to appointed counsel for indigent defendants in statutory first appeals of right proceedings from
subsequent discretionary hearings.' 16 In discretionary reviews the defendant is equipped with various legal documents to support his case,
such as a transcript of the trial proceeding, a brief filed on the appellant's behalf in the previous appeal of right, an opinion of the lower
court disposing of the case, and some type of testimony or submission
by the indigent herself." 7 The Court has concluded that the constitutional provision demanding that indigent defendants have an adequate and fair opportunity to present their claims within the adversary
system was satisfied when an indigent defendant had these materials
in hand and when he was not denied due process-even without the
assistance of counsel in a discretionary hearing.118 The Court did concede, however, that an attorney would prove helpful to a defendant in
preparing for a discretionary review. 119
4.

Due Process Requires Adequate Tools

In Griffin, Douglas, and Ross, the Supreme Court focused on the
tools an indigent defendant needed to present his case to the court for
consideration on the merits.' 2 0 The Court examined whether the indigent defendants had the tools available to them, and if not, what remedies were needed to amend or augment the procedures in order to
assure that the indigent defendants' due process rights were not violated. 2 ' It may be that indigent defendants have the means to participate in a fair proceeding, such as in Ross, when the defendant had
documents necessary to support his case. 22 But it may be that without some type of additional assistance, such as appointed counsel, a
court will deem the proceeding so fundamentally unfair that it violates
the individual's Fourteenth Amendment right to due process.
The bottom line in a Fourteenth Amendment Due Process claim is
this: Does the procedure allow all parties a fair opportunity to participate in the proceeding, or does it place such a serious burden on the
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.

See Douglas, 372 U.S. at 354-55.
417 U.S. 600 (1974).
Id. at 614.
Id. at 615.
Id. at 615-16.
Id. at 616.
See discussion supra Part III.C.
See discussion supra Part III.C.
See Ross, 417 U.S. at 615.
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defendant, as in Griffin and Douglas, that it causes the procedure
to
123

become a "meaningless ritual," which is fundamentally unfair?
5.

Texas's Approach to Providing Indigent Defendants a Change

in Appointed Counsel
As required by the United States Constitution, the State of Texas
appoints counsel to represent indigent defendants during criminal trial
proceedings.2 2 An indigent defendant is entitled to the assistance of

appointed counsel once adversarial proceedings have been initi-

ated. 125 Yet, a problem arises if an indigent defendant becomes dissatisfied with his appointed counsel before the trial has begun. 126 He is
unable to make a Strickland-type argument of ineffective assistance of

counsel because the trial has not yet been fully adjudicated. 127 Furthermore, courts have consistently recognized
that an indigent is not
1 28
entitled to the counsel of his choice.

123. See id. at 612; see also Evitts v. Lucey, 469 U.S. 387, 393-94 (1985) (citing
Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353, 358 (1963)).
124. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 1.051 (Vernon 2003 & Supp. 2004-2005).
"[A]s early as 1857, the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure provided, 'When the defendant is brought into Court, for the purpose of being arraigned, if it appears that he
has no counsel, and is too poor to employ counsel, the Court shall appoint one or
more practicing attorneys to defend him."' Catherine Greene Burnet et al., In Pursuit of Independent, Qualified, and Effective Counsel: The Past and Future of Indigent
Criminal Defense in Texas, 42 S.TEX. L. REV. 595, 597 n.1 (2001) (quoting Marin v.
State, 891 S.W.2d 267, 269 (Tex. Crim. App. 1994)). This was the law in Texas for over
a hundred years until Gideon. Id.
125. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 1.051(c).
126. In a survey on the current state of the indigent criminal defense system in
Texas, conducted by the State Bar of Texas, criminal defense attorneys reported that
indigent clients are treated poorly during the various stages of the judicial process.
Specifically, indigent clients have less experienced and less prepared attorneys, prosecutors' plea offers are different, and they receive harsher sentences. Burnett et al.,
supra note 124, at 606-07, 636-39. In addition, court-appointed attorneys are usually
compensated well below the ordinary rate for non-appointed lawyers or receive a flat
fee per case. See Robert L. Spangenberg & Marea L. Beeman, Indigent Defense Systems in the United States, 58 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBs. 31, 33 (1995). In one Texas
capital case, the State paid defense counsel $11.84 per hour. Stephen B. Bright,
Counsel for the Poor: The Death Sentence Not for the Worst Crime But for the Worst
Lawyer, 103 YALE L.J. 1835, 1838 (1994).
127. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 694 (1984). In Strickland, the
Court established that ineffectiveness requires proving counsel's performance was deficient and that the defense was prejudiced as a result. See id. To establish prejudice,
the defendant must show that there is a reasonable probability that the result in the
case would have been different but for counsel's deficient performance. Id.
128. See, e.g., Miller v. Smith, 115 F.3d 1136, 1143 (4th Cir. 1997) ("[A]n indigent
criminal defendant has no constitutional right to have a particular lawyer represent
him."); United States v. Graham, 91 F.3d 213, 217 (D.C. Cir. 1996) ("[A]n indigent
who seeks court-appointed representation had no constitutional right to the counsel
of his choice; he has only the right to effective representation."); Green v. Abrams,
984 F.2d 41, 47 (2d Cir. 1993) ("[A]n indigent defendant has no right to choose the
particular counsel appointed to represent her.").
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Consequently, the Texas Legislature has created a discretionary
right that allows indigent defendants the right to request a change in
appointed counsel. 1 29 An indigent defendant can obtain a change in
his appointed counsel if he can show "good cause.' 130 However, an

indigent defendant must successfully bear "the burden of proving that
he is entitled to a change of counsel,"- 3 1-and he must do this alonewithout the assistance of counsel. 132 As a result, in most cases, the

courts do not hear the
these cases, the "right"
essentially meaningless!
difficulties that indigent

merits of indigent defendants' requests. In
to request a change in appointed counsel is
The following Texas cases demonstrate the
defendants incur when they attempt to bear

this burden.
In Malcom v. State,'33 an indigent defendant filed a pro se motion

for the dismissal of his court-appointed counsel "alleging that an 'irreparable animosity' had developed between [himself] and [his appointed] counsel 'thus preventing a workable relationship between
attorney and client."" 3 4 However, the court overruled the defendant's motion without a hearing.' 35 The court found that the defen-

dant was not entitled to a hearing on the matter because he had not

requested a hearing.' 36
Similarly, in Garner v. State,1 37 an indigent defendant attempted to

argue during pretrial motions that he was entitled to a change in appointed counsel. 1 38 He testified that he wanted a change in appointed
counsel and that he had written a letter to the bar association complaining about his appointed counsel. 1 39 However, the trial court
turned down his request without inquiring into the nature of his
complaint. 4 °
On appeal, the indigent defendant asserted that the trial court erred
by not inquiring into the reasons why he wanted a change in his ap129. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 26.040)(2) (Vernon Supp. 2004-2005).
130. Id. The federal circuit courts of appeals have held that in "order to warrant a
substitution of counsel during trial, the defendant must show good cause, such as a
conflict of interest, a complete breakdown in communication or an irreconcilable conflict which leads to an apparently unjust verdict." United States v. Young, 482 F.2d
993, 995 (5th Cir. 1973) (citing Brown v. Craven, 424 F.2d 1166, 1170 (9th Cir. 1970);
United States v. Grow, 394 F.2d 182, 210 (4th Cir. 1968); United States v. Gutterman,
147 F.2d 540, 541 (2d Cir. 1945)).
131. Webb v. State, 533 S.W.2d 780, 784 n.3 (Tex. Crim. App. 1976) (citing King v.
State, 511 S.W.2d 32 (Tex. Crim. App. 1974)).
132. See Watson v. State, 95 S.W.3d 342, 344 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2002,
pet ref'd).
133. 628 S.W.2d 790 (Tex. Crim. App. [Panel Op.] 1982).
134. Id. at 791.
135. Id.
136. Id. at 792.
137. 864 S.W.2d 92 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1993, writ ref d).
138. Id. at 98.
139. Id.
140. Id.
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pointed counsel.' 4 1 He argued that his testimony regarding a change
42
in counsel was sufficient to compel the trial court to inquire further.
Nevertheless, the appellate court did not address whether the trial
143
court had a duty to further inquire into the defendant's request.
Instead, the appellate court avoided the issue by explaining that because the letter to the bar association was not contained in the record,
it was unable to determine if there was an actual conflict that the trial
court should have investigated. 4 This seems to suggest that the defendant's testimony alone did not impose a duty on the court to inquire. The appellate court stated that the defendant had at most
shown the "mere possibility of a conflict" between himself and appointed counsel. 145 As to the defendant's claim that he was entitled to
a hearing by the trial court on his motion, the appellate court once
again ruled that because he had not requested one, he was not entitled
to one.' 4 6
In Warren v. State, 4 7 the indigent defendant, like the indigent de-

fendant in Garner, filed a motion asserting that he was unable to effectively communicate with his appointed counsel. 1 48 He also filed a
grievance with the State Bar of Texas against the attorney in which he
expressed his desire to change his appointed counsel. 149 The trial
court denied the motion without a hearing. 150 The appellate court
held that because the defendant did not include a copy of the grievance in his motion, he had only shown the "mere possibility" of a
conflict between himself and his appointed counsel.' 5 ' The "mere
possibility" of a conflict was not sufficient to compel the trial court to
inquire into the reasons for the defendant's dissatisfaction. 152 Therefore, the indigent defendant was unable to53present evidence to support his case due to his procedural errors.'
Hill v. State'54 further demonstrates the difficulties that indigent defendants face when they are requesting a change in appointed counsel. "55
' This case also illustrates one court's inflexible and unfair
treatment of an indigent defendant who earnestly attempted to com141. Id.
142. Id. at 99.
143. Id.
144. Id.
145. Id.
146. Id. at 100.
147. 98 S.W.3d 739 (Tex. App.-Waco 2003, pet. ref'd).
148. Id. at 744.
149. Id.
150. Id.
151. Id. at 745 (quoting McKinney v. State, 76 S.W.3d 463, 478 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2002, no pet.)).
152. Id.
153. See id.
154. 686 S.W.2d 184 (Tex. Crim. App. 1985) (en banc).

155. See id.
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ply with the procedural rules that were imposed upon him in this proceeding.15 6 In this case, the defendant filed two pro se motions prior
to the beginning of the trial that stated he was dissatisfied with his
appointed counsel and that he desired substitute counsel.15 7 The motions stated that he "would show" the court specific reasons for his
dissatisfaction.' 58 The phrase "would show" suggests that he anticipated explaining to the court the assertions that were stated in his
motions. At the conclusion of the State's case, the defendant addressed the court as follows:
The Defendant: Yes, Your Honor, on those motions I filed in

The
The
The
The

Court:
Defendant:
Court:
Defendant:

The Court:
The Defendant:
The Court:

the court, is it in the record that the motions
that wasn't heard is it in the record that were
denied?
No
It's not in the records?
No
Is there any way possible it can be entered
into the records?
What motion specifically?
Every one of them which was filed.
First, there are several things wrong with that.
First of all, you are not co-counsel and never
will be. That is not the law of the State of
Texas. Secondly, some of the motions were
not timely filed, and, no, I am not going to
consider them at this late date.' 59

On appeal, the defendant argued that the trial court should have
held a hearing on his motions. 6 ° The court denied his appeal and
stated: "Even if we assume that appellant in the instant case brought
the matter to the trial court's attention, appellant did not request a
hearing on the matter nor otherwise attempt to make a record to support his contentions."' 16 ' The court explained that "in addition to
making the court aware of his dissatisfaction with [appointed] counsel
...a[n] [indigent] defendant bears the burden of substantiating his
claim. "162
Finally, in Newton v. State,'63 an indigent defendant submitted a pro
se motion to dismiss her court-appointed counsel and obtain substi165
tute counsel. 1 64 The court dismissed her motion without a hearing.
156. See id.
157. Id. at 185.
158. Id.
159. Id. at 186.
160. Id.
161. Id. at 187.
162. Id.
163. No. 70770, 1992 WL 175742 (Tex. Crim. App. June 17, 1992) (not designated
for publication).
164. Id. at *4.
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On appeal, Newton argued that the trial court erred by not allowing
her to present evidence to support her claim that she was entitled to a
change in appointed counsel.16 6 As in Malcom and Hill, the court
ruled that because the indigent defendant did not request a hearing,
the trial court was not obligated to conduct a hearing. 67
IV.
INDIGENT DEFENDANTS IN TEXAS HAVE A CONSTITUTIONAL
RIGHT TO THE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL WHEN REQUESTING A
CHANGE IN APPOINTED COUNSEL

The State of Texas forces indigent defendants to master complex
and confusing procedural rules in order to obtain a change in appointed counsel. The current system is not only unfair, it is unconstitutional!.68 In a proceeding to request a change in appointed counsel,
indigent defendants are constitutionally entitled to the assistance of an
interim appointed counsel to represent them for two reasons. First,
this proceeding meets the definition of a "critical stage" of a criminal
trial as defined by the United States Supreme Court, and the Sixth
Amendment requires states to appoint counsel for indigent defendants at all critical stages of a criminal proceeding.' 69 Second, this is an
unfair proceeding, the results of which could have a significant impact
on the disposition of the criminal trial. In these types of proceedings,
the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause requires the courts
to afford individuals
the opportunity to present their cases in a "mean1' 70
ingful manner.
A.

This Proceeding Is a Critical Stage of the Criminal Proceeding
as Defined by the United States Supreme Court

A proceeding is deemed a critical stage of a criminal proceeding if
the defendant is forced to confront the complexities of the procedural
system without the aid of counsel, and the assistance of counsel could
help17the
defendant protect certain rights that would otherwise be
lost. 1 As demonstrated by the cases above, indigent defendants
165. See id.
166. See id.
167. See id.
168. See supra notes 44, 46-48, 126-29 and accompanying text.
169. See Mempa v. Rhay, 389 U.S. 128, 134 (1967). The Sixth Amendment provides
in full:
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and
public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime
shall have been committed, which district shall have been previously ascertained by law, and to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation;
to be confronted with the witnesses against him; to have compulsory process
for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the Assistance of Counsel
for his defense.
U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
170. See Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68, 76-84 (1985).
171. See discussion supra Part II.A.

https://scholarship.law.tamu.edu/txwes-lr/vol11/iss1/10
DOI: 10.37419/TWLR.V11.I1.8

20

2004]
Messerli: The Poor Man's
Texas Should
Provide Interim Counsel f
THE Burden:
POORWhy
MAN'S
BURDEN
carry the burden of proving that they are entitled to a change in appointed counsel. But in Texas, they have been unable to meet this
burden. This is not because they necessarily lack good cause to merit
a change in appointed counsel, but rather because they have not been
given an opportunity to present the reasons for their requests in the
first place.1 72 In most cases, indigent defendants, such as those in the
previously discussed cases, are unaware of the proper procedural steps
that they must take in order to request a change in appointed counsel.
Thus, the opportunity is lost. 173 Without first successfully jumping
through the "procedural hoops" that are imposed upon them, they
cannot get to the second and most important step in this proceedingpresenting the reasons for their requests.
Many times indigent defendants fail to utter the "magic words" entitling them to a hearing on the matter or those required to preserve
their motions in the trial record for review at the appellate level. In
the cases of Malcom, Garner,Hill, and Newton, for example, all four
of the defendants filed motions requesting a change in appointed
counsel. 74 Yet, not one defendant received a hearing on the matter,
nor did the trial courts inquire into the reasons for the defendants'
dissatisfaction, even though the United States Supreme Court has
held that where the trial court knows or reasonably should know that
a particular conflict of interest exists between
an attorney and his cli1 75
ent, the court should initiate an inquiry.
The trial and appellate courts in those cases stated that because the
indigent defendants did not formally request a hearing on their motions, the indigent defendants were not entitled to a hearing. 1 76 It is
unlikely that an indigent defendant who files a motion with the court
explicitly explaining his dissatisfaction with his appointed counsel in
written form would be aware that he must also formally request a
hearing in order to repeat the same information verbally.
Additionally, indigent defendants are not familiar with the rules of
evidence and often fail to submit proper documentation to the trial
172. See, e.g., King v. State, 511 S.W.2d 32, 34 (Tex. Crim. App. 1974); Warren v.
State, 98 S.W.3d 739, 745 (Tex. App.-Waco 2003, pet. ref'd); Melendez v. Salinas,
895 S.W.2d 714, 715 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1994, no writ).
173. One Harvard law professor characterized a deprivation of rights due to a lack
of information as immoral. See Charles Fried, Correspondence:The Lawyer as Friend,
86 YALE L.J. 573, 586 (1977) (responding to Professors Dauer and Leff). "The rule of
law is not only a constitutional principle, it is a moral principle." Id. He argues that
by "counseling and helping others to operate the legal system a lawyer assists in the
realization of rights." Id.
174. See discussion supra Part II.B.5.
175. See Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335, 347 (1980).
176. See Newton v. State, No. 70770, 1992 WL 175742, at *4 (Tex. Crim. App. June
17, 1992) (not designated for publication); Hill v. State, 686 S.W.2d 184, 187 (Tex.
Crim. App. 1985) (en banc); Malcom v. State, 628 S.W.2d 790, 792 (Tex. Crim. App.
[Panel Op.] 1982); Garner v. State, 864 S.W.2d 92, 100 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st
Dist.] 1993, writ ref'd).
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court in order to support their motions to change appointed counsel.1 77 The indigent defendants in Garner and Warren both submitted
letters to the local bar associations expressing their dissatisfaction with
their appointed attorneys in addition to the motions they filed with
the trial courts.' 78 But, in both cases the trial courts refused to inquire
as to whether a problem existed between the indigent defendant and
appointed counsel
because a copy of the letter was not included with
17 9
the motion.

The Austin Court of Appeals recognized the value of legal counsel
in dealing with the procedural system when it held that constitutional
protection was warranted in Massingill v. State.' 80 The court held that
the period following sentencing, the time in which to move for a new
trial or perfect an appeal, was a critical stage of the proceeding.' 8 '
The court determined that the assistance of counsel was necessary in
order to ensure that the defendant followed the necessary steps to
preserve and pursue the right to appeal. 182 The court noted: "A defendant 'must comply with a myriad of procedural rules in order to
perfect a meaningful appeal."" 83 The court described the steps that a
defendant must take in order to present a meaningful appeal, such 1as
84
preparing, filing, presenting, and obtaining a hearing on a motion.
The court stated: "It is no more reasonable to require a defendant to
perform these tasks without the assistance of counsel than it is to require him to represent himself at a new trial hearing."185
As in Massingill, a defendant requesting a change in his appointed
counsel is forced to confront complex procedural rules without the
assistance of counsel.' 8 6 A defendant in either proceeding is required
to prepare, file, present, and obtain a hearing on a motion. 87 The
procedural requirements imposed on a defendant are the same regardless of whether the defendant is presenting a motion for his appeal or requesting a change in his appointed counsel.' 88 It is equally
unreasonable to expect that an indigent defendant requesting a
change in his appointed counsel would be able to successfully master
177. See supra notes 163-67 and accompanying text.
178. See supra notes 137-53 and accompanying text.
179. See supra notes 137-53 and accompanying text.
180. 8 S.W.3d 733, 736-37 (Tex. App.-Austin 1999, no pet.).
181. See id. at 737.
182. Id. at 736.
183. Id. (quoting Ward v. State, 740 S.W.2d 794, 797-98 (Tex. Crim. App. 1987)).
184. Id.
185. Id.
186. Id.
187. See id. at 736; Hill v. State, 686 S.W.2d 184, 187 (Tex. Crim. App. 1985) (en
banc).
188. See Massingill, 8 S.W.3d at 736; cf. Hill, 686 S.W.2d at 187 (stating that a defendant must "in addition to making the court aware of his dissatisfaction with counsel and stating the grounds for the dissatisfaction, a defendant also bears the
responsibility of substantiating his claim").

https://scholarship.law.tamu.edu/txwes-lr/vol11/iss1/10
DOI: 10.37419/TWLR.V11.I1.8

22

2004]
Messerli: The Poor THE
Man's Burden:
Texas BURDEN
Should Provide Interim Counsel f
POORWhy
MAN'S
the procedural rules any better than a defendant who is attempting to
obtain a new trial.
Because this proceeding requires indigent defendants to confront
the complexities of the procedural system during a proceeding in
which a right may be forfeited and the assistance of counsel could help
to protect this right, this proceeding meets the definition of a critical
stage as defined by the United States Supreme Court. 18 9 Therefore,
the courts must provide counsel to indigent defendants during proceedings in which they are requesting a change in appointed counsel.
B.

The Deprivation of a Liberty Interest Implicates the Fourteenth
Amendment's Due Process Clause

The deprivation of a liberty interest implicates the Fourteenth
Amendment's Due Process Clause and the requirements necessary to
satisfy it.190 This hearing for requested change in appointed counsel is
a subpart of a criminal trial in which the State is attempting to deprive
a defendant of a liberty interest. 191 Essentially, the Fourteenth
Amendment's Due Process Clause requires courts to conduct proceedings fairly. 9 2 It must give indigent defendants an adequate opportunity to present their cases "at a meaningful time and in a
meaningful manner." '9 3 But as the previously discussed Texas cases
demonstrate, indigent defendants in Texas are not given an adequate
opportunity to present their requests to change appointed counsel in a
meaningful manner. The State of Texas has placed the burden on indigent defendants to prove that they are entitled to a change in counsel by forcing them to overcome and satisfy confusing procedural
requirements. 194 But as demonstrated by the cases discussed above,
the Texas courts are often unresponsive to an indigent defendant's attempts to meet this burden. 1 95 Consequently, indigent defendants are
often treated unfairly by the judicial system in Texas.
For example, in Hill v. State, Mr. Hill asked the trial court judge to
rule on his motion requesting a change in appointed counsel to ensure
that the matter was recorded in the trial record and preserved for appeal. 96 The judge responded by telling Mr. Hill that Mr. Hill was
189. See supra Part II.A.1.
190. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV; Bd. of Regents of State Colts. v. Roth, 408 U.S.
564, 569-70 (1972).
191. See Roth, 408 U.S. at 572. Most certainly imprisonment is a deprivation of
liberty, but less serious punishments, such as a restriction on alcohol purchases, have
been found to be deprivations of liberty as well. See Wisconsin v. Constantineau, 400
U.S. 433, 436 (1971).
192. See Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 337 (1986) (Stevens, J., concurring).
193. Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545, 552 (1965).
194. See, e.g., Hill v. State, 686 S.W.2d 184, 187 (Tex. Crim. App. 1985) (en banc);
Garner v. State, 864 S.W.2d 92, 98 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1993, writ ref'd).
195. See discussion supra Part II.E.
196. Hill, 686 S.W.2d at 187.
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"not co-counsel and never [would] be" and that the judge would not
rule on Mr. Hill's motions. 197 This is the point! Mr. Hill was not an
attorney, yet he was held to the same standards as an attorney. Indigent defendants are expected to comply with all of the procedural
rules, yet they are chastised when they attempt to do the very thing
that the State has required them to do!' 98 By all measures, this is
unfair!
Incredulously, on appeal the appellate court stated that Mr. Hill
had not attempted to make a record to support his contention; therefore, the error had been waived. 199 One wonders what else Mr. Hill
could have possibly said or done to avoid his request being dismissed
due to procedural errors.
C.

This Proceeding May Have a Significant Impact on the Outcome
of the Criminal Trial

Fourteenth Amendment protection is also warranted in this proceeding because the disposition may have a significant effect on the
outcome of the criminal trial. This proceeding ultimately determines
who will serve as the indigent defendant's attorney, and the relationship between an attorney and his client can have significant effect on
the outcome of the trial. When a relationship of trust exists between
an attorney and his client, it is much more likely that an attorney will
be able to produce a favorable result for his client.2"
Although, in Morris v. Slappy,2 ° ' the United States Supreme Court
rejected the claim that the Sixth Amendment right to counsel included
a right to a "meaningful" attorney-client relationship, °2 in their concurrence, Justices Brennan and Marshall discussed the benefits a client enjoys when the attorney-client relationship is one "characterized
by trust and confidence. ' 20 3 The Justices stated that a defendant is
more likely to disclose personal or embarrassing information that
might benefit his case when he trusts and works closely with his attorney.20 4 They also stated that the attorney could best make crucial decisions when able to consult with the defendant throughout the
trial.2 0 5
Additionally, the American Bar Association Standards for Criminal
Justice state that "[n]othing is more fundamental to the lawyer-client
197. Id.
198. See supra notes 183-85 and accompanying text.
199. Id.
200. Wayne D. Holly, Rethinking the Sixth Amendment for the Indigent Criminal
Defendant: Do Reimbursement Statutes Support Recognition of a Right to Counsel of
Choice for the Indigent?, 64 BROOK. L. REV. 181, 187-88 (1998).

201. 461 U.S. 1 (1982).
202. Id. at 14.
203. Id. at 21 (Brennan, J., concurring).

204. Id.
205. Id.
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relationship than the establishment of trust and confidence. 2 °6 And
in Linton v. Perini,20 7 the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals similarly
stated that "[b]asic trust between counsel and defendant is the corner28
stone of the adversary system and effective assistance of counsel.
The relationship between a defendant and his attorney is highly confidential and demands faith and trust in order to ensure effective
advocacy.20 9
Conversely, a defendant whose lawyer is forced upon him might
perceive the law as contriving against him and fail to develop a beneficial relationship with his appointed counsel.2 10 In discussing this issue,
the United States Supreme Court stated:
An unwanted counsel "represents" the defendant only through a
tenuous and unacceptable legal fiction. Unless the accused has acquiesced in such representation, the defense presented is not the
defense guaranteed him b the Constitution, for, in a very real
sense, it is not his defense.
Therefore, the determination of whether an indigent defendant will be
forced to continue to be represented by unsatisfactory appointed
counsel has the potential to significantly impact the trial's result. Consequently, because this proceeding may have a significant impact on a
trial in which an individual's liberty is at risk, the proceeding is subject
to the requirements of the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process
Clause.21 2
The procedural errors committed by the indigent defendants in the
previously discussed cases resulted in huge penalties to those defendants.2 13 As a result of their procedural errors, they forfeited the right
to request a change in appointed counsel. 214 Both the Sixth Amendment and the Fourteenth Amendment demand the assistance of an
interim counsel in order to protect the indigent defendant's rights and
206. ABA Standards for Criminal Justice, Lawyer-Client Relationship Standard 43.1 cmt. at 149 (3d ed. 1993).
207. 656 F.2d 207 (6th Cir. 1981).
208. Id. at 212; see also Mead Data Cent., Inc. v. U.S. Dep't of the Air Force, 566
F.2d 242, 253 n.20 (D.C. Cir. 1997) ("[Tlraditionally the attorney-client privilege has
rested on the need to foster a relationship of trust and free discussion between a
lawyer and a private client."); In re Mandell, 69 F.2d 830, 831 (2d Cir. 1934) ("The
relationship between attorney and client is highly confidential, demanding personal
faith and confidence in order that they may work together harmoniously.").
209. Drumgo v. Superior Court, 506 P.2d 1007, 1012 (Cal. 1973) (en banc) (Mosk,
J., dissenting). In his dissent, Mosk stated that "[e]ffective advocacy involves more
than vigor, experience and familiarity with the law. The attorney-client relationship
contemplates trust and mutual cooperation, particularly when the attorney is defending the client's liberty." Id.
210. Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 834 (1975).
211. Id. at 821.
212. See Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68, 74, 83 (1985).
213. See supra notes 174-76 and accompanying text.
214. See supra notes 174-76 and accompanying text.
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to ensure a fair proceeding.215 Without the assistance of counsel, indigent 21defendants
are unable to present their cases in a meaningful
6
way.

V.

COST CONSIDERATIONS

Although one could argue that this remedy will increase the costs of
a criminal proceeding, in light of the fact that constitutional rights are
at issue in this case, this is a cost that must be borne. The United
States Supreme Court stated that the "vindication of conceded constitutional rights cannot be made dependent upon any theory that it is
less expensive to deny than to afford them. '2 17 When considering
possible solutions, the focus should be on the constitutional rights of
the indigent defendants, not the treasury of the particular jurisdiction.
Just as the Court held in Ake v. Oklahoma,1 8 any conflict between
providing additional funds and depriving an individual of a constitutional right must be resolved in favor of the indigent defendant.219
"Constitutional rights are not measured or limited by monetary considerations, ' 22° and the State cannot overlook the unconstitutionality
of a procedure simply because additional costs may be borne in order
to satisfy constitutional requirements.22 '
Additionally, providing assistance of counsel in this proceeding
could operate to provide a financial gain to the state by averting posttrial ineffective assistance of counsel determinations. If that determination is made posttrial, the State must appoint a new defense
attorney to retry the case and incur the costs of a new trial. 2 As a
result of providing indigent defendants with interim appointed counsel for the limited purpose of assisting them in requesting a change in
their appointed counsel, ineffective assistance of counsel determinations may be thwarted, thus saving the State money in re-trying the
case. In addition, due to the limited inquiry that must be made, the
time involved in the proceeding should be minimal, which will help to
contain the costs.
215. See discussion supra Parts II.A.1, III.
216. See Smith v. State, 368 N.E.2d 1154, 1158 (Ind. 1977).
217. Watson v. City of Memphis, 373 U.S. 526, 537 (1963).
218. 470 U.S. at 83 (concluding that a state's economic interest in not providing an
indigent defendant with the assistance of a psychiatrist was outweighed by the interest
of both the state and the individual in obtaining an accurate disposition).
219. See Makemson v. Martin County, 491 So. 2d 1109, 1112 (Fla. 1986).
220. Cunningham v. Super. Ct. of Ventura County, 177 Cal. App. 3d 336, 351 (Cal.
Ct. App. 1986).
221. See Makemson, 491 So. 2d at 1112.
222. See, e.g., Reyes v. State, 849 S.W.2d 812, 815 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993) (en banc);
Weaver v. State, 999 S.W.2d 913, 916 (Tex. App.-Waco 1999, no pet.); see also TEX.
CODE CRIM. ANN. art. 26.05(a) (Vernon Supp. 2004-2005).
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VI.

ALTERNATIVES TO PROVIDING INTERIM COUNSEL

Perhaps there are alternatives to providing indigent defendants with
interim counsel in this proceeding that will satisfy the constitutional
requirements of the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments. One possibility is to relax the procedural standards imposed on indigent defendants, as occurred in Goldberg v. Kelly.22 3 In that case, the Court held
that the procedures used by New York City in terminating public assistance payments to welfare recipients were constitutionally inadequate because they failed to permit recipients to appear personally
before an official who ultimately determined if they were able to retain their property interest in the welfare benefits.2 2 4 The Court explained, "The opportunity to be heard must be tailored to the
capacities and circumstances of those who are to be heard. ' 22 5 The
Court further explained that, in this case, written submissions
to the
226 Most of
decision maker were not adequate to satisfy due process.
the welfare recipients lacked the educational skills to write effectively.2 27 Without the assistance of professionals, they could not present their cases effectively. 2 8 The Court concluded that oral
presentations would better meet the requirements imposed by due
2 29
process.

In Goldberg, the Court held that because of the informal nature of
the proceeding, oral presentations satisfied the requirements of due
2 30 Yet, the
process.
proceeding at issue in this Article is part of a
larger criminal trial in which the parties are expected to comply with
formal procedural rules. Compounding this problem is the fact that
2 3 1 lower courts
since the Court decided Faretta v. California,
have
overwhelmingly held that a defendant representing himself in a criminal proceeding must comply with the procedural rules in the same
manner that an attorney would. 32 In Faretta,the trial judge informed
the defendant:
223. 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
224. Id. at 268.
225. Id. at 268-69.
226. Id. at 269.
227. Id.
228. Id.
229. Id.
230. Id.
231. 422 U.S. 806 (1975). In Faretta, the United States Supreme Court held that a
defendant in a criminal trial has a constitutional right to proceed without counsel
when he voluntarily and intelligently elects to do so, and the State may not force a
lawyer upon him when he insists that he wants to conduct his own defense. Id. at
835-36.
232. See, e.g., Smith v. State, 368 N.E.2d 1154, 1158 (Ind. 1977) (holding that the
defendant had not objected with enough specificity for the record to reflect the exact
issue and circumstances to sustain on appeal); Bowen v. State, 606 P.2d 589, 594
(Okla. Crim. App. 1980) ("[A] defendant selecting to proceed pro se should be held
to the same standard as an attorney; the right to waive assistance of counsel and proceed pro se is waived by failure of the defendant to make or review his demand on the
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You are going to follow procedure. You are going to have to ask
the questions right. We are going to give you every chance, but you
are going to play with the same ground rules that anybody plays.
And you don't know those ground rules. You wouldn't know those
ground rules any more than any other lawyer will know those
ground rules until
he gets out and tries a lot of cases. And you
233
haven't done it.

Additionally, the Court stated the right of self-representation is not
"a license not to comply with relevant rules of procedural and substantive law."'234 Texas courts have similarly held that pro se defendants should be held to the same standards as licensed attorneys when
following procedural rules.2 35 Furthermore, it does not appear that
judges have a duty to inform self-represented defendants of the steps
they must follow in order to follow procedural rules.23 6
A judge in an adversarial criminal proceeding functions as "an objective and detached magistrate. ' 237 The judge plays a passive role in
the trial, allowing the parties to present their evidence and develop
their cases. 238 The non-participation of the judge is an essential element of the adversary system. 23 9 Not surprisingly, appellate courts in
Texas have held that a judge does not have a duty to inform a pro se
defendant of procedural rules.2 40
Another alternative to appointing the assistance of counsel in these
proceedings is to appoint a standby counsel to assist indigent defendants in complying with the procedural rules. Standby counsel is used
record at trial."); Berry v. State, 552 P.2d 87, 88 (Okla. Crim. App. 1976) (stating that
defendant's failure to request opening and closing arguments be recorded for review
on appeal could not be raised as error on appeal); State v. Palmer, 580 P.2d 592, 593
(Or. Ct. App. 1978) (stating that the failure of defendant to comply with the rule and
make written request for a report of proceeding "constitute[d] a waiver of his right to
record and right to appeal based on record"); City of Bonney Lake v. Delany, 588
P.2d 1203, 1205 (Wash. Ct. App. 1978) (holding that the rules of procedure that apply
to parties represented by counsel applied equally to defendant in representing
herself).
233. Faretta,422 U.S. at 808 n.2.
234. Id. at 834 n.46.
235. Kindley v. State, 879 S.W.2d 261, 264 (Tex. App.- Houston [14th Dist.] 1994,
no writ) (quoting Brown v. Tex. Employment Comm'n, 801 S.W.2d 5, 8 (Tex. App.Houston [14th Dist.] 1990, writ denied)); see Webb v. State, 533 S.W.2d 780, 786 (Tex.
Crim. App. 1976) (requiring appellant to comply with all relevant rules of criminal
procedure).
236. See Joshua L. Howard, Hybrid Representation and Standby Counsel: Let's
Clear the Air for the Attorneys of South Carolina,52 S.C. L. REV. 851, 855 (2001).
237. Michael Pinard, Limitations on JudicialActivism in Criminal Trials, 33 CONN.
L. REV. 243, 251 (2000).
238. Id. at 252-53.
239. See id. at 252.
240. See, e.g., Kindley, 879 S.W.2d at 264. In Kindley, when a pro se defendant
complained on appeal that the trial court erred by not informing him of the steps that
he must follow in order to protect his rights, the appellate court responded by stating,
"Appellant is not entitled to 'special treatment.'" Id.
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when a defendant chooses to defend himself.2 4' Generally, the
standby counsel "sits at the defense table with the pro se defendant...

[and] provides legal advice to him, without actually presenting his de-

fense. 24 2 The use of standby counsel is beneficial to a defendant who
desires to represent himself because the standby counsel's assistance is

limited only to those instances in which the defendant requests assistance.2 43 Ultimately, the pro se defendant remains in control of his
own defense.
Appointing standby counsel to assist indigent defendants in this
proceeding would not satisfy the requirements necessary to pass constitutional muster because of the limited, and often confusing, role of
standby counsel.2 44 The defendant must recognize the need for assistance and bring it to the attention of the standby counsel before the

standby counsel can assist the defendant. 245 An indigent defendant is
entitled to the same level of assistance from counsel that would be
provided at any other "critical stage" or proceeding in which he is
forced to confront the procedural system.2 4 6 If an indigent defendant

is restricted to assistance from counsel only when he requests it, he is
likely to be in no better position than if he is acting alone. Furthermore, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals has held that there is no
constitutional right in Texas to legal representation that is partially
pro se and partially with counsel.24 7
VII.

CONCLUSION

In order to satisfy the constitutional requirements of the Sixth and
Fourteenth Amendments, indigent defendants in Texas should be
granted an interim counsel for the limited purpose of providing them
legal assistance when they request a change in their appointed counsel.248 When an indigent defendant requests a change in his appointed
counsel, it is a critical stage of the criminal proceeding, and the United
States Supreme Court has held that the Sixth Amendment requires
the presence of counsel to protect the rights of indigent defendants in
241. See Ann Bowen Poulin, The Role of Standby Counsel in CriminalCases: In the
Twilight Zone of the CriminalJustice System, 75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 676, 676 (2000).
242. Marie Higgins Williams, The Pro Se Criminal Defendant, Standby Counsel,
and the Judge: A Proposal for Better-Defined Roles, 71 U. COLO. L. REV. 789, 793
(2000).
243. See id. at 807.
244. See Poulin, supra note 241, at 703-04.
245. See, e.g., United States v. Mullen, 32 F.3d 891, 894 (4th Cir. 1994) (stating that
the trial court below required standby counsel to sit in first row, to be available for
consultations, and not to offer advice unless asked); United States v. Mills, 895 F.2d
897, 900 (2d Cir. 1990) (showing that the trial court below instructed the defendant
that standby counsel was "merely in court for [the defendant] to consult and nothing
else").
246. See Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 68-69 (1932).
247. Landers v. State, 550 S.W.2d 272, 280 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997).
248. See supra notes 72-75 and accompanying text.
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all critical proceedings.2 4 9 This proceeding, which occurs after the initiation of the adversarial process, forces indigent defendants to confront the complicated procedural system without the aid of counsel.
Historically, the United States Supreme Court has recognized that
the average layperson is unequipped to deal with the complex procedural rules in the American legal system, 250 and "[h]e requires the
guiding hand of counsel at every step in the proceedings against
him."25' 1 Appointed attorneys are the "guiding hands" that are needed
to help defendants maneuver through the legal system because indigent defendants are unprepared to run the gauntlet of the court's procedural rules in the same manner as attorneys. Additionally, the
"appointment of counsel for an indigent is required at every stage
of a
criminal proceeding where substantial rights of a criminal accused
may be affected. '25 2 Indigent defendants could benefit from the aid
and assistance of legal counsel because counsel would protect a right
that would otherwise be lost if the indigent defendant was unable to
2 53
present his request in the required form.
The Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause mandates a fair
procedure and "[f]airness requires rough equality between adversarial
opponents. ' 25 4 As it stands today, a proceeding in which an indigent
defendant requests a change in appointed counsel is meaningless due
to the imbalance between an indigent defendant's knowledge of the
procedural system and the requirements of the procedural system.25 5
As demonstrated by the Texas cases previously discussed, indigent defendants are placed in an unequal and inferior position when they are
faced with the task of following legal technical procedural rules.2 56 In
effect, this is not a "fair fight" between equal opponents. 25 7
On the surface, the judicial system in Texas appears to allow indigent defendants the opportunity to request a change in their appointed counsel; 25 8 however, the current system is actually only
providing "mere access" to the courthouse. In depriving indigent defendants of legal assistance in this proceeding, they are, in effect, deprived of the "raw materials" that they need to establish their cases. 259
Without the assistance of counsel, they are subjected to an unfair,
249. United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 224 (1967).
250. United States v. Ash, 413 U.S. 300, 307 (1973).
251. Powell, 287 U.S. at 69.
252. Mempa v. Rhay, 389 U.S. 128, 134 (1967).
253. See, e.g., Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682, 689 (1972); Coleman v. Alabama, 399
U.S. 1, 7-10 (1970); Wade, 388 U.S. at 226-27.
254. Gardner, supra note 10, at 400.
255. See supra notes 163-67 and accompanying text.
256. See discussion supra Part II.B.5.
257. See Gardner, supra note 10, at 400.
258. See Palacios v. State, No. 01-02-00498-CR, 2003 WL 21357328, at *6 (Tex.
App.-Houston [1st Dist.] June 12, 2003, pet. ref'd) (mem. op.) (not designated for
publication).
259. See Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68, 77 (1985).
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one-sided procedure that deprives them of an opportunity to present
their requests for a change in appointed counsel on the merits. 260 The
burden on indigent defendants to successfully follow complex procedural rules is fundamentally unfair and requires that the assistance of
counsel be provided in order to remedy this problem and satisfy the
requirements of due process.2 6 '
"The right to the assistance of counsel guaranteed by the Sixth and
Fourteenth Amendments is indispensable to the fair administration of
our adversarial system of criminal justice. ' 262 It is "the right to counsel [that] safeguards the other rights deemed essential for the fair
prosecution of a criminal proceeding. '26 3 Furthermore, "[o]f all the
rights that a [defendant] has, the right to be represented by counsel is
by far the most pervasive, for it affects his ability to assert any other
rights he may have. '264 In order for an indigent defendant to obtain a
substitute in his appointed counsel, he must be provided interim counsel to assist him in following the procedural rules, or as Justice Sears
of the Fourteenth District Court of Appeals in Houston stated in a
case in which a pro se defendant failed to follow the procedural rules:
the old adage
"Once again, a pro se litigant has proven the wisdom of
'one who represents himself has a fool for a client.' ,,265
Shelly Messerli
260. See supra notes 154-62 and accompanying text.
261. See supra notes 154-62 and accompanying text.
262. Maine v. Moulton, 474 U.S. 159, 168-69 (1985).
263. Id. at 169.
264. Walter V. Schaefer, Federalism and State Criminal Procedure, 70 HARV. L.
REV. 1, 8 (1956).
265. Kindley v. State, 879 S.W.2d 261, 264 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1994,
no writ).
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